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Abstract 
This paper analyses the risk assessment and decision-making used by a police force to 
assess the suitability of a person to own a firearm. The decision to grant a firearms 
licence has many characteristics of a ‘wicked problem’. Firearms Enquiries Officers 
(FEOs) in the police force concerned primarily use professional judgement to solve this 
problem, employing various forms of reasoning and heuristics, but potentially also 
prone to cognitive bias. We conclude with some observations on how training of FEOs 
and their supervisors in risk assessment and decision-making might be further 
developed. 
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Introduction 
The ability of members of the public in the UK to obtain licensed firearms remains tightly 
controlled, with successive legislation incrementally giving rise to one of the most 
restrictive firearms control regimes in the world (Squires et al., 2008: 10). Gun 
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ownership levels in the UK are also relatively low compared with most other European 
countries (European Commission, 2013: 7) and Greater London has one of the lowest per 
capita rates in England and Wales.1 Further, the majority of the 32,000 or so licence-
holders in Greater London are law-abiding citizens who have good reason to own a 
shotgun or firearm, and store and use their guns in a safe and responsible manner. 
Moreover, compared to other more ‘action-oriented’ spheres of policing, firearms 
licensing may appear to be a largely bureaucratic, transactional function with little to 
interest the policing or academic communities. 
And yet the three most recent, non-terrorist-related mass killings in the UK that 
involved the use of firearms (in Hungerford in 1987, in Dunblane in 1996 and in the 
county of Cumbria in 2010) were all committed by individuals holding shotgun and/or 
firearm certificates.2 Similarly, there have been several tragic domestic incidents 
involving licensed firearms, including the attempted murder of Rachel Williams in 2011, 
the murders committed by Michael Atherton in Durham in 2012, and the murders of 
Christine and Lucy Lee in Surrey in 2014. Evidence is also emerging of an upward trend 
in firearms offences in England and Wales from 2016 onwards (Allen and Audickas, 
2017).3 
In England and Wales the procedures that determine whether a member of the public 
can lawfully possess and use a firearm are governed by the Firearms Act 1968 (as 
amended). The Home Office Guide on Firearms Licensing Law 2016 provides detailed 
guidance to police forces on how best to interpret and implement statute (Home Office, 
2016). 
The Firearms Act 1968 provides several tests in relation to the grant or renewal of 
certificates (licences). A key test is that a police force chief officer must be satisfied that 
any grant or renewal of a licence is ‘without danger to the public safety or to the peace’. 
However, as HMIC notes, ‘there is no definition, either in the Firearms Act 1968 or in 
the Home Office guidance to describe or explain how “danger to the peace” should be 
applied’ (HMIC, 2015: 8). Case law offers limited direction, but suggests that 
‘irresponsible and uncontrolled behaviour’ would amount to ‘danger to the peace’ 
(HMIC, 2015: 63). In the absence of detailed guidance, police forces have taken a 
pragmatic approach on what constitutes ‘irresponsible and uncontrolled behaviour’ 
amounting to ‘danger to the public safety or peace’. However, there can also be a tension 
between the emotive or normative effect of an incident involving a certificate-holder and 
the tests imposed by the Firearms Act 1968 which govern how the police can react. For 
example, during the analysis of 730 case files (see ‘Methods’ below) we found 
certificates revoked by FEOs and their managers on grounds such as ‘unsuitable 
behaviour to have a SGC [shotgun certificate] or FAC [firearms certificate], case of 
possession of multiple indecent images’. In this case even if this licence-holder were to 
be convicted of an offence under the Protection of Children Act 1978 and subject to a 
Community Order there would still not be a prima facie case that public safety or order 
would be at risk if the certificate were not revoked.4 However, neighbours of the 
convicted person might naturally question why the offender retained the ‘right’ to own a 
potentially lethal weapon and was licensed to do so by the local police force. 
Forces are also expected to ‘have regard’ to Authorised Professional Practice (APP) 
on firearms licensing, issued by the UK’s College of Policing (College of Policing, 
2016). APP provides advice to police forces on the risk factors that could be considered 
when deciding on licensing firearms, and these include any history of domestic incidents 
or violence, and the medical and mental health of the applicant (College of Policing, 
2016). However, the advice does not include a rationale for the choice of the risk factors 
listed, nor how these factors should be weighted or combined in an overall assessment. 
In 2015 HMIC also found that many police forces in England and Wales were ‘working 
outside’ APP (HMIC, 2015: 10). It is also of note that neither statute, guidance nor APP 
provide forces with a comprehensive description of how those with delegated authority 
should arrive at a decision, and this allows ‘room for interpretation and the creation of 
inconsistency in the way firearms licensing is undertaken within and between police 
forces’ (HMIC, 2015). 
In 2015 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabularies (HMIC, now HMICFRS) 
reviewed firearms licensing across England and found that the way that forces managed 
the risk in relation to legally-held firearms was ‘unsatisfactory’. Indeed, HMIC 
concluded with the observation that ‘we cannot make our position any clearer: it is now 
for others to accept the need for change. If they do, perhaps the life of the next victim of 
firearms misuse might be saved. What is highly likely is that, if change is not effected, 
there will be another tragedy’ (HMIC, 2015: 75). 
There is clearly a need for a deeper understanding of the assessment and management 
of risk in firearms licensing in the UK and how decisions are made in practice. The two 
key questions that emerge are just how police forces should tackle the risks associated 
with the ‘wicked problem’ of firearms licensing (particularly as some ‘off the shelf’ risk 
assessment tools appear to be fraught with both conceptual and technical difficulties) and 
how current practice and training should be developed to support sound and effective 
decision-making? 
Literature review 
Although there is little research specifically concerned with risk assessment and firearms 
licensing in the UK5 there are cognate studies concerned with how risk and decisions are 
made in other fields of policing and law enforcement. Of pertinence is a study by Carson 
et al. which reviews how the police and other public-sector employees take ‘risky’ 
decisions which may lead to, or prevent, serious injury. The authors suggest that good 
leadership, rather than administration or management, is necessary to tackle such ‘wicked 
problems’ (Carson et al., 2013). Other studies focus upon risk assessment and decision-
making in relation to specific policing activities, such as managing missing person 
enquires (Smith and Shalev Greene, 2015), child protection (Munro, 1999), exercising 
the use of force (Dror, 2007) or protecting victims of domestic abuse (Ariza et al., 2016b; 
Robinson et. al., 2016b; Sebire and Barling, 2016). 
Whilst the subject of these studies differ, it is possible to discern a number of common 
findings. In particular there is a concern around the value of highly structured risk 
assessment methodologies, such as the use of ‘risk matrices’, which can lead to inflexible 
thinking and the devaluing of professional judgement (Munro, 1999). Dror emphasises 
the value of developing specialist cognitive skills through experience but supported 
through effective instructional and reflective opportunities (Dror, 2007). Moreover, two 
studies independently question the value of risk assessment tools when not supported by 
effective training and leadership (Sebire and Barling, 2016; Smith and Shalev Greene, 
2015). Similarly, a study by Robinson et al. into the use of risk assessment tools in 
relation to domestic abuse was ‘consistent with prior research which suggests that 
practitioners often rely on a small subset of risk factors, despite the presence of other 
available information which may be relevant for evaluating risk’ (Robinson et al., 2016b: 
11). 
Methods 
The methodology employed included desk-bound research and information collection to 
understand how firearms licensing legislation and guidance was implemented by the 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)’s Firearms Enquiry Team (FET); the risk assessment 
and decision-making processes used by the FET; the sampling of firearms application 
‘case files’; the development and testing of three scenarios subsequently used alongside 
‘dummy’ firearms application forms and a series of semi-structured interviews with FET 
staff. 
The interviews with FET staff were conducted in two phases: the first phase included 
13 Firearms Enquiry Officers (FEOs); the second phase of interviews involved four 
sergeants who consider recommendations made by the FEOs and in some instances make 
the final decision to grant or renew a firearms or shotgun licence. The semistructured 
interviews explored the FEO’s general approach to decision-making and specific risk 
assessment in firearms licensing, followed by a series of questions based on three 
scenarios issued to FEO participants at the beginning of interviews. Semistructured 
interviewing was used as it can elicit valuable qualitative insights into police decision-
making and receptivity in other policing contexts (for example, Lumsden, 2017). 
The scenarios included alongside the dummy application form involved the renewal 
of a shotgun licence and the grant (that is, a first-time application) of a firearm licence 
and these were developed through iteration and revision. Scenarios were employed as 
they are capable of generating rigorous, actionable material for researching complex and 
uncertain contexts (Ramirez et al., 2015) and have been used successfully in other 
research into police decision-making (for example, Brown and Daus, 2015). The 
scenarios were based on the collation and analysis of information from a large sample of 
Greater London applicant/licence-holder ‘case files’ – folders for each individual that 
contained the application form(s), an ‘enquiry form’ and risk assessment proforma 
completed by an FEO, references provided by the applicant, intelligence and other police 
database reports, GP reports (where applicable) and a report made by the FEO for a 
supervisor (normally a FET police sergeant) which included recommendations on 
decisions.6 A stratified7 random sample of case files8 spanning the years 1992–2016 was 
made and a relational database (tested for reliability and validity) was created. A 
proportion of sampled case files included reasons for an application for a firearms licence 
to be refused in the first instance (in which case no certificate was issued) or ‘revoked’ 
at some point after grant (for example, because of a subsequent criminal conviction) or 
for the refusal of an application for renewal (after five years). The database was queried 
and the primary reasons for refusal or revocation identified. The three primary reasons 
for refusal to grant a certificate (in descending order of frequency) were ‘violence’, 
‘driving offences’ and ‘domestic violence’.9 However, the three main reasons for 
revoking a certificate (also in descending order) were ‘domestic violence’, ‘mental health 
problems’ and ‘violence’. Furthermore, Latent Cluster Analysis (LCA) (Collins and 
Lanza, 2010) highlighted a correlation between ‘driving offences’, ‘alcohol abuse’ and 
‘violence’ as factors likely to lead to a refusal.10 Similarly, for revocation, LCA 
highlighted correlation between ‘mental health’ and the ‘security of a firearm’. Three 
scenarios were constructed using the database queries and the LCA results. The scenarios 
were presented to FEO interviewees alongside a standard firearms application form (a 
‘201’) together with background information on the ‘applicant’.11 The research 
interviewer had additional information which could be provided ‘on demand’ during 
discussion of the application form and scenario if requested by the FEO interviewee. 
Supplemental questioning focused on the FEO’s cognitive processes and decision-
making when dealing with each dummy application and associated scenario, the 
reasoning behind their responses, and how they arrived at the overall recommendation. 
A brief initial analysis of the semi-structured interviews revealed the key points and 
risk assessment and decision strategies used, and these informed the second set of 
interviews with the sergeants. The sergeants were provided with the same set of scenarios 
(including background information) together with the summary report completed by the 
FEO. The purpose of the interviews with the sergeants was to gauge concordance 
between the FEO’s recommendations and their line manager’s decisions, and to gain 
insight into the forms of dialogue and argumentation that occurs. 
The transcripts of the semi-structured interviews were analysed for general 
decisionmaking and risk assessment strategies employed, and in particular the presence 
of forms of reasoning, heuristics and possible cognitive biases. As part of this analysis, a 
qualitative content analysis (after Mayring, 2000) and coding framework was employed 
with master tables of common forms of reasoning, heuristics and types of cognitive bias 
derived from the literature (for example, in terms of heuristics, Shah and Oppenheimer, 
2008: 214). Reliability and validity of the coding was improved through the use of 
triangulation between the results obtained by the researchers involved in analysing the 
transcripts. 
Results 
An applicant is assessed for the risk he or she poses in terms of future threats (which may 
or may not involve the use of a licensed firearm), judged against a legal framework which 
empowers the police to either refuse an application for a shotgun or firearms certificate 
or to revoke an existing certificate. When doing so, Firearms Enquiry Officers (FEOs) 
and their supervisors are encouraged and expected to adopt a form of ‘structured 
professional judgement’, in common with other forms of the ‘policing of risk’ (for 
example, domestic violence; Robinson et al., 2016a: 2). Complementary actuarial 
(statistical) methods of risk assessment are not currently used by the Firearms Enquiry 
Team (FET) surveyed but at the time of writing (2018) were being explored. 
Although the risk assessment methods used by FEOs shared much in common with 
police officers in more operational roles, many of the cognitive and decision-making 
processes employed by FEOs permitted consideration of risks other than those used 
during rapid ‘on-the-spot’ risk assessments. FEOs were better able to consider all the 
realistic potential risks associated with an individual, checking evidence that either 
supports or refutes a hypothesis concerning the applicant, and drawing conclusions based 
on the results of their investigations. 
Our semi-structured interviews with FET staff revealed that external factors played a 
significant role in FEO decision-making (echoing the findings of Dror (2007), on police 
officers’ decisions to use force). In particular, FEOs were conscious that where a firearms 
application is rejected or a certificate is revoked, the applicant had a statutory right of 
appeal at Crown Court. They were also acutely aware that there would be significant 
repercussions on the FEO responsible if a tragedy occurred that could be even partly 
attributable to their assessment of risk. 
FEOs and the ‘home visit’ with the applicant 
During the semi-structured interviews for this research all the FEOs stressed the 
importance of a visit to the home of an applicant (the ‘home visit’). This was reinforced 
during the interviews with the sergeants, who explained that they would regularly opt for 
additional face-to-face meetings with the applicant should the FEO report require further 
investigation or a second opinion. There is no Home Office obligation on police forces 
to conduct a home visit in the case of a renewal application for a certificate (unless a 
‘riskbased assessment’ suggests otherwise: Home Office, 2016: 87, 91). When asked 
about this, the interviewees expressed that they would find it very difficult to advise on 
a ‘renewal’ applicant without a home visit. They were also very clear that a home visit 
was needed (not just a face-to-face meeting at some other location), as the home setting 
was seen as a major component in determining ‘fitness’ to own a firearm. 
Both the analysis of the case files and the semi-structured interviews provided 
examples of the condition of the applicant’s home being used by many FEOs as a ‘proxy’ 
for the physical and mental state of the applicant, with a dilapidated building potentially 
indicating mental and/or physical illness. FEOs, however, made it clear that this was not 
a final judgement, but simply a prompt for later questioning. The home visit is also used 
by the FEO to collect evidence that supports or contradicts the information given on the 
application form. In doing so, the FEOs are using the material presented on the 
application form as a self-declared ‘picture’ of the applicant (albeit limited in nature), 
and then use the home visit to detect any possible significant disparities from this 
impression. 
FEOs described their assessment of the fabric of the applicant’s home visit assessment 
as being a threefold process: namely to assess the type of building in the context of the 
area, the physical security of the location and the condition of the person’s home (the 
latter as a possible insight into mental and physical health of the applicant). 
As a part of a preparatory reconnoitre, the FEOs assess the applicant’s home compared 
with other buildings in the neighbourhood and evaluate its condition, layout and level of 
occupancy. Many of the MPS FEOs had worked in the same geographical areas for 
several years and it is likely that they were comparing the building, its location and 
occupants with others in the locality and using this to inform the assessment of risk. The 
FEOs noted any observable alarm systems and any shared entrances or communal areas 
so they could be discussed subsequently with the applicant in the interview. 
Once inside the applicant’s home, FEOs described carrying out a similar assessment 
of the interior of the building, looking for indicators of physical security, the state of the 
rooms and how the building relates to similar dwellings in the surrounding area. This 
evaluation of the interior of the premises would be tested against the impression given 
by the exterior and, if the two matched, some level of corroboration is given to the initial 
assessment of the applicant. If the two do not correspond, then the mental picture is 
revised to accommodate the new information, or a flag is raised to indicate the need for 
further investigation. 
The FEOs considered the home visit interview with the applicant to be the most 
‘individualised’ aspect of risk assessment, with each FEO adopting his or her own 
approach. In all cases, however, it was clear that the outcome of the home visit interview 
was an important contribution to the FEO’s assessment of the applicant and the 
recommendation to a supervisor. FEOs were aware that they might have to elicit 
information which the applicant may not wish to divulge (such as an undocumented 
criminal past, stresses in personal relationships, or medical problems). Direct 
questioning, however, tended only to be employed when the applicant was being evasive 
or did not appear to understand the question. The response of applicants to questions was 
carefully monitored and evasiveness, stalling or prevarication perceived by some FEOs 
as an indicator of possible deliberate deception. However, whilst FEOs appear to be using 
intuitive methods to identify potential lying or deception (based on verbal and other cues) 
they did not appear to root their techniques in any ‘evidence-based’ research or theory 
(for example, Vrij, 2008; Whelan et al., 2015) and particularly so in terms of ‘factoring 
in’ stress as a contributory explanation for some of the behaviour of applicants during 
the home visit. 
Forms of reasoning employed by FEOs 
For the purposes of this research, we defined ‘reasoning’ as the ‘set of evaluative and 
inferential processes that people have at their disposal and can draw on in the process of 
making decisions’ (Koehler and Harvey, 2004: xv). However, it is worth noting at the 
outset that sound (valid and reliable) reasoning does not, by necessity, lead to ‘correct’ 
decision-making.12 An FEO might also employ reasoning to assess a risk posed by an 
applicant and arrive at the ‘right’ decision but then decide on a different outcome for 
physiological or psychological reasons, or because of the adverse influence of ‘group 
think’ (Baron, 2005). The stresses involved in firearms licensing might paradoxically 
lead to either increasing the likelihood of making the wrong decision, or in the case of 
moderate stress, it could improve decision-making (Starckea and Branda, 2012). 
The qualitative content analysis of the transcripts of the semi-structured interviews 
provided clear examples of the forms of reasoning the FEOs used to draw an inference 
(for example, deriving conclusions) from the information available to them.13 Three 
particular cognitive forms of inferential reasoning were identified using the methods 
described earlier:14 abduction, induction and deduction. 
Abductive reasoning is ‘reasoning to the best available explanation’ or deriving the 
most likely explanation that fits the observed facts, observations or assumptions. 
Abductive reasoning parallels the ‘clinical reasoning’ (Durning, 2018; Haig, 2008; Ward 
and Haig, 2007) used in medical contexts. For example, an FEO might decide that certain 
information concerning an applicant is indicative of attempted deception and that other 
possible explanations are sufficiently unlikely in the circumstances to be discounted. The 
FEO employment of abductive reasoning may be of particular note for as Patokorpi 
(2007: 172) observes ‘abduction comes to its own in the face of incomplete evidence and 
high uncertainty that are usually related to very rare or non-repeatable events and to the 
realm of the unique in general’. The abductive reasoning employed by FEOs was also 
often ‘non-monotonic’ and dynamic in nature– the plausibility of an inference increased 
or decreased as new information emerged in scenarios (see ‘Methods’ above), and the 
inference was modified. 
Deductive reasoning essentially involves reasoning where a conclusion (the 
deduction) must necessarily follow if the assumptions (premises) are true. The strength 
of inference using deductive reasoning resides in its ‘watertight’ nature: the conclusion 
must by necessity follow from the suppositions. Although inferences derived through 
deduction were not often explicitly articulated in the FEO interview transcripts and case 
files we analysed, a number of FEO observations concerning risk were clearly based (at 
least in part) on deductive reasoning. For example, if the assumed age of the applicant 
(as derived from the date of birth given in the application form) contradicts other 
information then a conclusion is that one or other is incorrect. This is in itself cause for 
further investigation of the possibility of deliberate deception. 
Inductive reasoning takes a variety of forms, including generalising from specific 
occurrences that have common features, to a more general rule (to go from ‘some’ to 
‘all’). Forms of inductive reasoning we identified in interview transcript analysis 
included ‘analogical reasoning’ (Gentner and Smith, 2013) and ‘case-based reasoning’ 
(Ribaux and Margot, 2003). With the latter, risk assessment was made with reference to 
previous similar (analogous) situations which were often drawn from the experience of 
the individual. It is also possible that although the analogous examples may be unique 
and specific to actual previous cases the FEO could be drawing on more archetypal 
‘schema’ (prototypes, scripts, familiar sequences of events with recognisable characters). 
The analysis of case files and FEO responses to scenarios demonstrated that even 
apparently simple inferences made by FEOs were often implicit combinations of 
different forms of reasoning, combined as complex forms of probabilistic inference – that 
is, examples of ‘complex cognition’ (Knauff and Wolf, 2010). FEOs might use abduction 
to make an initial ‘guess’ (or hypothesis, a preliminary ‘diagnosis’) which is then tested 
using deduction (what would logically follow as a consequence?) and induction (what 
information/evidence supports or refutes this?). This leads to an inference being 
supported, rejected in favour of alternatives, or abandoned altogether. 
Use of heuristics by FEOs 
The ‘heuristic’ is a form of decision-making that uses simple ‘rules of thumb’ reasoning 
to solve complex problems (Mousavi and Gigerenzer, 2014: 5) in a ‘fast and frugal’ 
manner, reducing the ‘cognitive load’ on individuals. Remarkably, heuristics do not 
necessarily trade off accuracy for speed as more information and deliberation do not 
necessarily lead to better decisions (Todd and Gigerenzer, 1999). However, although 
heuristics are indispensable tools for decision-making in everyday life, their failure (for 
example, in non-routine situations) can equate to forms of cognitive bias (Gilovich et al., 
2002). 
The use of a ‘representativeness’ heuristic15 by FEOs when assessing the risk 
presented by an applicant was identified through analysis of the semi-structured 
interviews, with home environments and applicant behaviour during the interview being 
seen as ‘representative’ of archetypes. However, it is was emphasised by FEOs that they 
do not simply accept the first explanatory hypothesis but rather search for more evidence, 
both contradictory or affirmative. This is especially the case when assessing the mental 
health of applicants, as FEOs reported using overt observations of behaviour and 
environment (such as messy houses or unusual speech patterns) as ‘proxies’ for mental 
stability. However, the application of these criteria could easily lead to false positives 
(e.g. caused by factors unrelated to mental health) and without further assessment, could 
lead to an inaccurate assessment of risk. Most FEOs were aware of this problem, and all 
expressed the view that such criteria would not be the sole justification for a refusal, and 
would be used only as a basis for further assessment. 
This research also identified evidence of the ‘availability heuristic’16 being employed 
by FEOs as a means of assessing risk: the immediate ‘summoning up’ of a similar set of 
circumstances that had occurred recently and its outcome. However, not all FEOs were 
aware that the availability heuristic could constitute a form of cognitive bias and the need 
to avoid misjudging the level of risk simply through having encountered a similar event 
recently, especially if the event was emotionally charged or unusual. This is a particular 
danger given the repetitiveness of the application process and the quantity of 
applications. 
Finally, the analysis of the interviews and case files indicated that some FEOs are also 
regularly using the ‘anchoring and adjustment’ heuristic16 in the risk assessment process. 
This involves the FEO determining a working hypothesis and using the generated 
information to support, refute or to adjust the hypothesis. When utilising this heuristic, 
the FEO starts with the working hypothesis that the applicant is suitable to possess a 
firearms certificate. As information about the applicant is gathered, the FEO continually 
reassesses this hypothesis, turning a binary decision-making process into a more ‘shades 
of grey’ assessment of risk. 
Decision-making support for the FEO and supervisors 
Our desk-bound research, information gathering, analysis of case files and 
semistructured interviews confirmed that the application form(s), the police database 
checks, the medical report, the home visit and interview are the main ways the FEO 
gathers information. Both the FEO and their supervisor must then risk-assess the 
information collected and make a binary decision – to grant or deny a licence. 
We found that there are three tools potentially available to FET staff to help them 
assess information and make an informed decision: a police service ‘risk matrix’, the 
College of Policing ‘National Decision Model’ (NDM) and an MPS ‘Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework’ (MPS, 2015). 
A number of police forces use a ‘risk matrix’ to help guide the assessment of the risk 
factors, as recommended by the College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice 
(APP) in order to ‘prioritise workloads’ (College of Policing, 2016). Moreover, the 
Firearms and Explosive Licensing Working Group (FELWG)17 have endorsed a specific 
firearms licensing risk matrix.18 There are several obvious advantages in using risk 
matrices to inform decision-making, not least the simplicity and clarity of the risk 
assessment process and outcome. However, our analysis of case files (see ‘Methods’ 
above) identified inevitable technical problems when risk is quantified in a simple 
numerical manner using integers (whole numbers) and nominal variables are treated as 
if they are at the interval level of measurement.19 It is also not clear, for example, why a 
linear scale is frequently adopted with risk matrices rather than, say, a logarithmic one. 
Questions could also be raised about the practice of multiplying likelihood scores by 
impact scores, which is presumably based upon an assumption of statistical independence 
(otherwise a conditional Bayesian probability would be more appropriate). Our research 
findings echo both other recent studies into the problematic use of riskassessment tools 
in other areas of policing, particularly in relation to domestic abuse (Robinson et al., 
2016a; Sebire and Barling, 2016; Smith and Shalev Greene, 2015) and earlier more 
general research into the limitations of ‘risk matrices’ (Cox, 2008). 
The second tool for decision-making for FEOs and their managers is the policing 
National Decision Model (NDM).20 The NDM was launched in 2012 and adopted by the 
MPS FET in 2014. It consists of six elements, with the Code of Ethics (as the first 
element) being central to the remaining five elements (information; assessment; powers 
and policy; option; and action and review). The relevant College of Policing Authorised 
Professional Practice outlines 10 risk principles that are aimed at encouraging and 
supporting professional judgement, and these are fundamental to the NDM (College of 
Policing, 2013b). 
In terms of decision-making for firearms licensing, the ‘Assessment’ element of the 
NDM is significant. It involves ‘assessing the situation, including any specific threat, the 
risk of harm’ (College of Policing, 2013b). A user of the NDM is advised to ask his or 
herself the questions: ‘How probable is the risk of harm?’, ‘How serious would it be?’ 
and ‘Is that level of risk acceptable?’ (College of Policing, 2013b). FEOs often made 
reference to the NDM during our semi-structured interviews with them and in their 
responses to the dummy application forms and scenarios (see ‘Methods’ earlier). 
However, a number of FEOs did express doubts concerning the applicability of the NDM 
to the risk-assessment problems they confront on a daily basis and suggested that the 
model had greater applicability to operational policing (a reservation shared by O’Neill, 
2018: 83). 
FEOs also discussed the use of the MPS ‘Vulnerability Assessment Framework’ 
(VAF), particularly to assess the mental health of an applicant when conducting a home 
visit. The VAF is a ‘tool to assist MPS police and staff in identifying vulnerability in 
members of contact they have contact with’ (MPS, 2015). Although it was designed to 
help front-line officers identify vulnerable people, the framework has been adopted and 
adapted by FEOs for the mental health risk assessment elements of firearms licensing. 
The VAF has five main components (‘ABCDE’ – ‘Appearance, Behaviour, 
Communication capacity, Danger and Environment circumstances’). Whilst not used in 
the same manner as with the original VAF, these five criteria are assessed by the FEO on 
the home visit and the conclusions are used to inform the risk-assessment of the 
applicant’s suitability to be granted a certificate. This modified ‘ABCDE’ assessment 
seems to encourage an FEO focus on the key potential indicators of vulnerability, and 
can also help articulate any nascent concerns. 
However, in general terms the mental health assessment training provided to FEOs 
was not seen as sufficient, with most FEOs stating that they did not feel that the training 
provided them with the necessary ‘tools for the job’. The reliance on GP reports alone to 
identify applicants with mental health conditions was also identified as problematic. 
Indeed, a consistent theme emerging from the semi-structured interviews with FEOs was 
that gaining access to medical information, whether relating to mental or physical health, 
was one of the most difficult aspects of the role. Current practice is that applicants declare 
any relevant medical conditions at the time of application. FEOs also write to GPs on 
receipt of an application to ask whether the applicant has any relevant medical conditions 
(covered by a declaration of consent on the initial application form), and to place an 
‘enduring marker’ on the patient’s medical record to show for the duration of the licence 
that the person has ready access to guns. However, case files analysed during our research 
indicated some GP unwillingness to cooperate with the FET and provide information – 
citing ‘conscientious objections’ to anyone owning firearms, others stating that they were 
not qualified to provide opinion about their patient’s mental health, whilst others claimed 
that it was not within their contract to provide such a service. Similar problems were 
encountered by other police forces in 2016 (PULSE, 2016). The situation is further 
complicated when an applicant uses a private doctor. In addition, case file analysis 
suggested that even when an FEO obtains a medical report, there is often insufficient 
specialist advice available to interpret its relevance to the applicant’s suitability to own 
firearms. 
Limitations of the research 
Inevitably there are a number of limitations with our research, particularly in terms of the 
methodologies employed. First, conclusions are based on desk-bound research and an 
analysis of case files and semi-structured interviews with staff from a single police force, 
albeit the largest in the UK.21 Second, assumptions were made when sampling case files 
which might be not be valid. Given the relatively large time period that samples were 
drawn from, it was also not surprising to encounter incomplete or inchoate case files. 
Third, in terms of a working definition of ‘risk’ with firearms licensing we adopted a 
pragmatic approach of identifying the most commonly held interpretation within the 
FET, but this was not necessarily shared by all FEOs in the team (or indeed, by other 
police forces). Fourth, the identification of forms of reasoning, heuristics and possible 
cognitive biases amongst FEOs and their managers was problematic on a number of 
levels: these include the likelihood that FEO cognition will often be a collaborative group 
process22 (Theiner et al., 2010); that interviewees are sometimes unable or unwilling to 
express thought processes,23 particularly when ‘thinking fast’ (Kahneman, 2012) and 
especially in circumstances where risk is involved. Fifth, the methodology adopted for 
the analysis of transcripts (although tested in other policing contexts) relied in part on the 
skill of researchers in identifying canonical forms of reasoning, heuristics and cognitive 
bias. Finally, one of the authors is both a police officer and an experienced manager of 
FEOs,24 with the attendant issues encountered when operating within the ‘insider 
insiders’ (Brown, 1996) dichotomy in police research. 
Discussion and conclusions – a ‘wicked problem’? 
Our research found that estimating ‘risk’ (in the sense of the likelihood of an individual 
posing a threat in the future) involved in firearms licensing rapidly takes the form of a 
‘wicked problem’.25 Decision-making is made particularly difficult in the context of 
firearms licensing due to the complexities and confusions of firearms law (NBIS cited in 
Law Commission, 2015: 1). The rules established by the Firearms Act 1968 which 
provide the legal framework for the process of licensing are ambiguous, while official 
guidance is similarly open to (non-binding) interpretation. Further, the risk assessment 
carried out by FEOs and their managers is almost always based on incomplete 
information. Referees are selected by the applicant and liaison between the police and 
medical practitioners is currently fraught with difficulty. Moreover, the issue of drawing 
inference from police intelligence checks is problematic, with few evidence-based 
methods available to aid risk-assessors to gauge the importance of the information 
gathered. Riskmatrices or similar ‘automating’ tools can also cause decision-making 
difficulties, both theoretical and practical. 
Although risk assessment is a relatively common undertaking in policing (for 
example, in terms of children reported missing; Hayden and Goodship, 2015) and 
ubiquitous across a range of security fields (Phythian, 2012), firearms licensing involves 
the particularly difficult task of determining what indicators might be pertinent, and what 
weight they should carry. We found during the analysis of case files many examples of 
decision makers attempting to assess factors such as an applicant’s apparent interest in 
Nazi memorabilia, uncovered during a ‘home visit’; reconciling alternative lifestyles 
with societal norms (such as an applicant living in a small one bedroom flat with ten large 
dogs, and their faeces evident throughout the premises); what importance to place on 
previous offending history (for instance, should a caution for an assault five years ago 
adversely affect an application?) and how best to assess the relevance of declared medical 
conditions. 
It is clear also from our research that, at least in one large police force, the home visit 
and interview is at the heart of the FEO information-gathering process that informs risk 
assessment. FEOs used the home visit to assess risks which could only be discerned in 
person (such as environmental scanning of the neighbourhood, physical security, the 
demeanour of the applicant and any other person living there, and the nature of the 
interior of the home environment). This is a critical facet of the information-gathering 
phase and likely to be weakened by any move by police forces towards replacing the 
home visit with telephone-based risk-assessments, particularly in terms of initial 
application (an observation supported by HMIC, 2015: 81). 
Our research also confirmed that FEOs employ a number of cognitive means to help 
arrive at an assessment of risk, including combinations of canonical forms of reasoning. 
FEOs also employ familiar mental shortcuts such the ‘anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic’. There was also some evidence that the FEOs were aware of the dangers 
inherent with heuristics and, more generally, the possibility of cognitive bias. 
Our research finding concerning the lack of formal training of FEOs and their 
supervisors was also a factor highlighted in the 2015 HMIC report into firearms 
licensing, and more recently in the highly critical IPCC report into firearms licensing in 
Surrey following the murder of Christine and Lucy Lee (IPCC, 2016). Whilst a number 
of police forces in England and Wales (most notably, Dorset Police; HMIC, 2015: 26) 
have offered courses to FEOs from 2007 on a national basis, none were nationally 
accredited and not all police forces utilised them (HMIC, 2015) and this position remains 
unchanged (FELWG, 2016). Hence, there is further research needed concerning what 
training staff involved in firearms licensing in 43 police forces in England and Wales 
have received, how learning is assessed and what measures are taken to ensure 
consistency from force to force. 
The question of providing a nationally accredited training course of FEOs was 
considered in 2016 by the College of Policing, when they suggested that ACPO (now 
replaced by the NPCC) was ‘seeking to develop accredited appropriate training’ (College 
of Policing, 2016). Our research suggests that, in addition to legislation, guidance and 
authorised practice, training should focus on the how of firearms licensing. For example, 
the formulating and testing hypotheses; the principles and theories of risk assessment, 
sensitivity and specificity of risk; pattern recognition and anomaly detection; heuristics 
in decision making and cognitive errors. Practical training with ‘dummy’ firearms 
application forms and scenarios that are designed to stimulate the use of the different 
forms of reasoning required for risk assessment might also assist trainee FEOs in 
recognising cognitive and other logical fallacies. 
Finally, it is clear that further research is also needed to discover whether other police 
forces consider risk and make decisions in a similar way to the MPS FET when granting 
or revoking the right of a member of public to legally obtain a firearm. The results of 
such research would enable FEOs and others to contribute to the ‘morphing of experience 
into evidence’ (Pease and Roach, 2017) that is required to help solve the ‘wicked 
problem’ of firearms licensing. 
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Notes 
1. Reflecting the fact that most legally held firearms in the UK are used for gamekeeping, 
fieldsports, pest control and target shooting and hence the highest per capita rates occur outside 
of cities in rural locations of the UK such as North Yorkshire (Home Office, 2017). 
2. In the UK firearms and shotguns are both ‘lethal barrelled weapons’ (as defined by the 
Firearms Act 1968). However, there are some differences in licensing criteria between the 
two, defined as distinct elements as s. 1 (firearms) and s. 2 (shotguns) by the Act. Nevertheless, 
for ease of reference this paper will use the term ‘firearm’ to cover both s. 1 and s. 2 guns. 
Similarly, the term ‘application’ is used to denote a grant or renewal application, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
3. It is not known what proportion of the increase is due to legally-owned firearms but this 
islikely to be small. 
4. Although the possibility of the offender self-harming might be a risk and hence likely to leadto 
revocation of the licence. 
5. Most studies appear to be US-focused; for example, Yuval (2011), Phillips (2013), 
Webster(2015) and Mueller (2017). 
6. Case files for those refused on application, or whose licences had been revoked 
containedadditional information. 
7. The strata reflected the volume of applications each year and the proportions selected werealso 
increased for more recent years of application. The sample size for 2014 was 61% (93 from a 
possible 153) and for 2015 it was 66% (98 from 149). Sample sizes from previous years are 
unknown but, given the random nature of the sampling, would be expected to be similar (apart 
from the period 1992–2004). 
8. The files were predominantly in paper format, containing loose-leaf documentation for 
eachapplicant, but were digitalised and collated for the purposes of this research. 
9. Note, however, that the definitions of ‘domestic violence’ and ‘domestic abuse’ had 
changedduring the period covered by our sample. 
10. Cluster analysis is a practical tool used to reveal ‘natural groupings’ within datasets. 
Althoughcluster analysis has been employed for some time in marketing, biology (including 
genetics) and medical research, it has only recently been employed to better understand 
‘hidden’ patterns in crime and policing data. 
11. For example: ‘Mr Allen is a 35-year-old stockbroker from Tottenham who has applied for 
afirearm certificate for both .22RF and .308 calibres in order to target-shoot and control 
vermin. He lives alone in a flat. His application seems fine: his background checks have come 
back with no issues, he has been through an induction course at a local shooting club and his 
GP states that Mr Allen is of sound body and mind. His referees are a local magistrate and a 
surgeon at “St Barts” hospital. He has regularly been attending a shooting club for three 
months.’ 
12. There are a number of possible reasons for this, including on grounds of logic alone 
(forexample a sound argument being employed, but invalid assumptions have been used 
through limitations in the information available). 
13. The forms of reasoning, heuristics and cognitive biases that we identify in this section 
andelsewhere in the paper might occur ‘naturally’ within decision-making by FEOs or might 
also have partly arisen as a result of the research methodology used. See ‘Limitations of 
research’ later. 
14. Additional forms of reasoning were also found but are not discussed in this paper. 
15. First identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). For an example of its use in 
anotherprofessional ‘diagnostic’ context such as nursing, see Ferrario (2003). 
16. Again, first formally identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). 
17. At its head is the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) lead for firearms licensing. A 
national FELWG meeting is held once a quarter with police force representatives and other 
stakeholders such as the Home Office, NABIS, the NCA and others. This is replicated at 
regional level, where regional representatives brief their fellow firearms licensing managers. 
18. At the time of writing the matrix is five by five, with one scale measuring ‘likelihood’ and 
theother measuring ‘impact’ – the potential danger to the public. In both cases the scale ranges 
from ‘very low’ (one) to ‘very high’ (five). 
19. For instance, in the FELWG risk matrix ‘treatment for mental illness’ will be awarded 
aparticular risk ‘score’, whereas a previous history of ‘multiple assaults’ scores two thirds of 
the value. 
20. This was devised and promoted by the College of Policing (2013a) for the police service as 
awhole and not exclusively for use by FEOs and their managers. 
21. However, the legislative context, Home Office guidelines and College of Policing APP 
arecommon to all police forces in England and Wales. 
22. Particularly when leading to deliberate (conscious) decision-making. 
23. Hence our use of scenarios. 
24. Although he did not participate in semi structured interviews, case file or transcript analysis. 
25. A ‘wicked problem’ is a seemingly intractable problem with no simple solution, 
wheredecisions are made based on incomplete and confusing information and the outcome is 
not simply ‘true’ or ‘false’ but more often ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The term was coined by Churchman 
(1967) although Rittel and Webber (1973) provided a detailed description of 10 characteristics 
that differentiate ‘wicked problems’ from more readily solvable ones. 
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